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In August 2012, the South African Police Service opened fire on miners who had gone on 
a wildcat strike to demand higher wages at the Marikana platinum mine owned by the 
Lonmin Corporation in the North West province. Thirty-four miners were killed and 
many more were injured during the shooting. The Marikana incident drew huge attention 
from local as well as international media. I t was reported as an incident of suppression by 
the African National Congress (ANC) government which could be compared to that of 
the apartheid government. After this incident, the strike by the miners spread to other 
mines, and several mines were forced to temporarily halt their operations1. The violent 
strike action also spread to other occupations, most notably among the truck drivers in 
Gauteng and farm-workers in the Western Cape, some of which have continued into 
20132. 
The Marikana incident, though undoubtedly catastrophic and unparalleled with regards 
to the number of casualties and police action, should not be seen as an isolated event. 
Wage struggles by striking workers are almost annual events in South Africa. In spite of 
some progress in the provision of public services, such as water and sanitation, 
electrification, and the construction of public housing for the poor since 1994 (Statistics 
South Africa 2007), the ANC government has not been able to meet the expectations of 
1 "Zuma Announces Inquiry into Marikana Shooting," Mail and Guardian Online, 17 August 2012; "'Miner 
Spring' may Lead to More Unrest:' Mail and Guardian Online, 6 September 2012; "Demands Escalate as 
Strikers Go for Broke," Mail and Guardian Online, 19 October 2012. 
2 "Farm Workers' Strike: Violence was a Long Time Coming," Mail and Guardian Online, 16 November 
2012; "Farmworkers' Strike: N o Silver Bullet for Rural Unrest," Mail and Guardian On/ine, 15 January 2013. 
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its people. During the Mbeki administration (1999-2008), protests and demonstrations by 
the poor began to increase. In 2008, the grievances of poor people exploded in the form 
of xenophobic violence against migrants from the rest of the African continent, who 
were clearly victims of scapegoating. Jacob Zuma succeeded Mbeki in 2009 as president 
by gathering support from workers and poor people. Since then, the Zuma administration 
has repeatedly emphasised job creation and the provision of public services for the poor 
as its policy priorities. Nonetheless, strike actions and public protests have intensified 
rather than decreased under the Zuma administration3. 
In the background to the increased protests and strike actions, one can point to 
widening income inequality and its changing nature in South African society after 
democratisation. The Gini coefficient in 1993 was 0.66, which was one of the highest in 
the world, and this was considered most eloquent evidence of the racial discrimination 
and inequality created during apartheid. It has however increased to 0.68 in 2000 since the 
end of apartheid and to 0.70 in 2008 (Leibbrandt et al. 2010: 32-33, Table 2.6). While the 
income gap between the white and black4 populations is still not negligible (Leibbrandt et 
al. 2010: Table A.3.2), inter-racial inequality has been on the decline. In contrast, 
intra-racial inequality has widened and become increasingly visible within the black 
population (Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 304-306, Tables 9.1, 9.2, 9.3). This was partly due 
to the rapid growth of black middle and affluent classes, while the unemployment rate 
remained at around 25%5. After 1994, the number of black people in professional jobs 
and management positions increased, especially in the public sector (civil servants), 
through the employment equity policy that has aimed to redress racial inequality and to 
promote black economic empowerment (BEE). This has resulted in the emergence of a 
new black middle class, often called "black diamonds", who are increasingly seen as an 
important consumer market. In addition, numerically small, but socially influential black 
capitalists and tycoons are also created through BEE share transactions (Seekiogs and 
Nattrass 2002: 12-16; 2005: 308-313; Southall 2004). The intensification of popular 
protests in the late 2000s is perhaps a reflection of the deepening sense of relative 
deprivation felt by the poor in post-apartheid South Africa. 
This chapter explores the development of BEE policy and practice since 1994 and 
discusses its key features, achievements, prospects and challenges. While BEE has 
certainly contributed to the emergence of black middle and affluent classes, thus 
deracialising the South Mrican economy, it has also attracted a large amount of criticism 
from various stakeholders and remains one of the most controversial of the 
government's policies. On the one hand, the large corporate sector, still dominated by 
white capitalists and managers, tends to see BEE as an obstacle to economic growth, even 
3 "A Massive Rebellion of the Poor," Mail and Guardian Online, 13 April2012. 
4 Based on the definition of the BEE policy, this chapter employs "black" as a general term referring to 
all three groups classified as "other than white" in the apartheid racial registration, i.e. "coloured", 
"African" and "Asiatic (Indian)". 
5 
"Jobless Growth," The Economist, 3 June 2010 (http:/ /www.economist.com/node/16248641, accessed 5 
July 2012). 
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if its political necessity seems to be accepted (CDE 2007). On the other hand, most 
scholars, political commentators as well as organised labour, criticise the narrow definition 
and limited outcome of BEE, which so far has favoured a tiny minority of black elites 
with strong political connections (Southall 2004: 538; Tangri and Southall 2008: 701; 
Mbeki 2009: chap 3; Marais 2011: 144). Even though the economic empowerment of 
black people is one of the key items on the social and political agenda of democratic 
South Africa, the question of how to achieve it is far from settled. In this context, this 
chapter aims to shed light on the progress and further challenges of meaningful 
empowerment for black people through tracing the development path of BEE policy and 
practice up to the present. 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first and second sections discuss the key 
features of two distinctive phases of BEE policy and practice in South Africa. The first 
phase started in 1993 just before the first democratic elections and was led by the white 
corporate sector, which wanted to eo-opt black elites as their allies. While this early phase 
largely set the direction and established the meaning of black empowerment in the 
country, it was soon heavily criticised for its limited effect. From 2000 onwards, the 
second phase of BEE kicked in. This phase can be characterised as increased state 
intervention in the economy in order to accelerate the BEE process. In the third section, I 
will highlight both the achievements so far and the criticism of BEE in an attempt to 
provide a balanced assessment. In conclusion, I will summarise the main argument of this 
chapter and speculate about the prospects for policy change in the post-Mangaung 
period. 
1. THE FIRST PHASE OF BEE: PRIVATE DEALS AND EMPLOYMENT 
EQUITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1993-2000 
The development of BEE policy and practice in South Africa is divided into two phases. 
The first phase is characterised as the white corporate sector-driven process, which began 
just before the first democratic elections, when several large companies sold some of their 
shares to black investors. Although the Reconstr-uction and Development Programme (RDP), the 
first election manifesto of the ANC, which was published on the eve of the first 
democratic elections in 1994, clearly stated the deracialisation of "business ownership and 
control" "through focused policies of black economic empowerment" as its "central 
objective" (ANC 1994: 93), the ANC did not have concrete policies on how it was going 
to achieve this. Against this background, the BEE process was initiated by the white 
corporate sector that wanted to create black capitalists and managers who were 
sympathetic to its needs. In 1993, Sanlam, an Afrikaner-controlled insurance company, 
sold a 10% stake in its subsidiary (Metropolitan Life: Metlife) to a black consortium called 
Metlife Investment Holdings (Methold, now known as New Africa Investment Ltd: 
NAIL) (Marais 2011 : 140)6. Following this, a number of mainly large corporations on the 
6 "History of Sanlam:' Sanlam website (www.sanlam.co.za), accessed 24 October 2012. 
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Johannesburg Stock Exchange QSE) concluded similar share transactions with black 
investors and consortia in the mid-1990s (SAIRR 2010: 336). The BEE deals of the 
mid-1990s were part of the process known as the "unbunclling" of the large 
conglomerates which reorganised themselves by focusing on their core business, while 
simultaneously discarding unproductive operations (Marais 2011: 141; Nishiura 2008: 
chap 4). Black investors were timely recipients of the subsidiaries of these disintegrating 
conglomerates. This form of share transaction, where white-owned enterprises sell part 
of their or their subsidiary's share to black investors or consortia came to be known as 
BEE share deals or BEE deals, and it became a common means of incorporating black 
elites into the mainstream of economic activities and creating black capitalists and 
managers in post-apartheid South Africa. More recently, BEE share transactions by which 
BEE entities sell their shares are also called BEE deals or BEE transactions (Wu and 
Moodley 2009). 
Another initiative taken by the white corporate sector during this period was the 
appointment of black directors in its boardrooms. In 1992, there were only 15 black 
directors out of a total of 1,173 directors in the top 100 )SE-listed companies. By 1997, 
the number of black directors had increased to just below 100. By the end of 2003 the 
number of black directorships (posts) increased to 432. These were held by 307 black 
persons (Vuyo et al. 2004: 1-3), and this number rose to 558 in 2006, 24.9% of all 
directorships on the JSE (Wu, Serrao and Matjakana 2006). In 2010, the number of black 
directorships increased to 951. These were held by 770 black persons (Empowerdex 
n.d.[2011?]). Most black directors occupied non-executive positions and often particular 
individuals sat on more than one board. This, in practice, meant that large white 
corporations actively sought out a small number of black individuals who were 
considered to have good connections with the ruling party. For example, Cyril 
Ramaphosa, once a prominent trade union leader who led political negotiations in the 
early 1990s between the National Party government and the ANC and later became a 
symbol as a BEE tycoon, occupied 7 ]SE-listed company non-executive directorships in 
2006. Another well-known example is Tokyo Sexwale, the first premier of Gauteng 
province, who became a business tycoon and then returned to politics as the Minister of 
Human Settlement under the Zuma administration. He occupied 2 )SE-listed company 
executive and 4 non-executive directorships (Bridge et al. 2007). 
The BEE deals produced a number of new black-owned and black-controlled firms 
where black people owned a large amount of the shares, but many of them did not really 
own them in the sense that they had incurred debts to the financial institutions for the 
loan that had been taken out to purchase these stocks. In many cases, a mechanism 
known as special purpose vehicles (SPV) was created in order for people to raise enough 
capital to realise the BEE deals. SPV s, in essence, were companies established for the sole 
purpose of promoting the purchase of stocks of a target corporation by the BEE group. 
It was usually a loose, ad hoc consortium of several stakeholders, including prominent 
black businessmen and women, investment companies, and employees' trusts or 
community trusts. In order to repay the loan to the financial institutions, the price of the 
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shares owned by the black companies had to remain high, as they were relying on the 
dividends. However, the shate prices at the JSE plummeted at the end of 1998 following 
the South-East Asian economic crisis. This tevealed the real weakness of black companies, 
and it became difficult for them to find a financial institution that was willing to finance 
BEE deals ot new black companies. As a result, many new black companies and investors 
were forced to go out of business (BEE Commission 2001: 6, 24-25; Seekings and 
Nattrass 2002: 13; Freund 2007: 665). 
The failure of these early BEE deals was spectacular, but we should not forget that out 
of these early BEE deals emetged several leading black-controlled companies and black 
tycoons in some industries where the government had regulatory powers in giving 
operational licences. In particular, the deregulation of the following industries played an 
important role in the growth of black companies: the information and communications 
technology industry (IC1), including mobile phone companies, the media 
broadcasting industry (television and radio) and the gambling (casino) industry. In these 
industries, the government actively promoted black ownership and control by making it 
compulsory for corporations to have BEE partners if they wanted to be granted new 
licences (BEE Commission 2001: 36, 43; Seekings and Nattrass 2002: 13). For instance, 
the Mineworkers Investment Company benefited from its shares in Primedia, Hosken 
Consolidated Investments had shares in the YFM (the Youth radio station) and e.tv, and 
Kagiso Trust Investments in Kagiso Media. However, it should also be emphasised that 
the regulatory power of the government was not a sufficient condition for the growth of 
black corporations. Perhaps more importantly, the tremendous growth of these relatively 
new and therefore unconventional industries was a key to the success of the new black 
corporations (Cargill2010: 11-15). 
While the private sector was responsible for the birth of new black corporations, black 
directors and tycoons during the 1990s, the government managed to exercise its power in 
promoting affirmative action in the workplace where it could, i.e. in the public sector. 
While black billionaires stand out in society, their numbers are very small. The majority in 
the new black middle class are, in fact, public sector workers, including teachers and 
nurses, and professional workers in private corporations (Seekings and Nattrass 2002: 13; 
2005: 309-310). It is arguable that the Employment Equity Act of 1998 played an 
important role in promoting their emergence. The purpose of this Act is to eliminate any 
discriminatory employment practices against specific groups (black, women and persons 
with disabilities) and to enhance their representation in the workplace. It supports the 
principle of affirmative action and encourages a company to employ qualified people 
from these groups. It also stipulates that companies have to formulate an employment 
plan in accordance with the principle of the Act, and submit it and report on its progress 
to the Commission for Employment Equity that was created by the Act. Large companies 
with 150 or more employees are obliged to do this every year, while smaller companies 
with less than 150 employees have to do so every two years (CEE 2011). 
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The report of the Commission for Employment Equity (2011)7 clearly shows that 
employment equity is most advanced in the public sector. While the racial composition of 
the economically active population is 73.6% African, 11 % Coloured, 3.2% Indian and 
12.1% White, the percentage of Africans in top management positions in the public 
sector accounts for 66.6% (81.9% for black people as a wholeS), in senior management 
positions for 57.7% (72.3% for all black people), in professional and middle management 
positions for 58.9% (77.9% for all black people) and in technical and junior management 
positions for 71.6% (92.3% for all black people) (CEE 2011: 5, 25). Given that the 
percentage of black people in both top and senior management positions in the public 
sector was a mere 6% in 1994 (Southall 2004: 533-534), these differences are remarkable. 
Southall (2005; 2007) also alerts us to the fact that the majority of the directorships of 
state-owned corporations are occupied by black people. 
In contrast, the employment equity figures for the private sector show a completely 
different picture. The percentage of Africans in top management positions in the private 
sector is a mere 9.6% (the figure is 11.1% for black people as a whole), in senior 
management positions 12.6% (28.7% for all black people), in professional and middle 
management positions 22% (41.3% for all black people) and in technical and junior 
management positions 41.2% (62.8% for all black people) (CEE 2011: 26). There are also 
some differences among the different sectors and industries within the private sector. The 
Commission for Employment Equity (2011: 11) singles out retail, motor trade/ repair 
services and wholesale trade services as the least progressive sectors. In contrast, the 
gambling industry, where the government has strong regulatory power through the 
provision of licencing, seems to take employment equity more seriously. Sallaz (2009: 
223-229) gives an interesting insight into the mind-sets of casino managers in Gauteng 
province in th.e late 1990s to early 2000s. These managers were required to draw up an 
empowerment plan, employ black people, and report on the progress of the plan to the 
provin.cial gambling board in order to obtain and keep their casino licence. Apparently, 
white managers take this obligation very seriously, as the provincial gambling board often 
conducts surprise visits and can impose a flne or even revoke the licence if it discovers 
a discrepancy between the plan and the actual workforce. 
7 Since smaller companies with less than 150 employees are required to submit their employment equity 
report only every second year, they do so in every year that ends with an even number. This means that 
the Commission for Employment Equity's reports published in the year that ends with an odd number 
analyse the reports submitted by both the larger and the smaller companies, while those published in the 
year that end with an even number do so only for the reports submitted by the larger companies. 
8 As stated in the footnote 4 above, this chapter uses "black" as a general term referring to "coloured", 
''African" and ''Asiatic (Indian)". 
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2. THE SECOND PHASE OF BEE: WIDENED DEFINITION AND 
EXPANDED TARGETS FOR BEE AND INCREASING STATE 
INTERVENTION, 2000 TO THE PRESENT 
Criticism of the limitations of private sector-driven BEE and the lack of a state policy or 
state control over the process was soon voiced by aspirant black businessmen (Tangri and 
Southall2008: 703-705). In late 1997, the national conference of the Black Management 
Forum (BMF) passed a resolution calling for a revisit of the BEE process, which had 
been conceptualised, controlled and led by the private sector, and for drafting a new 
vision for BEE by black people. In the following year (1998), the Black E conomic 
Empowerment Commission (BEE Commission) was set up under the Black Business 
Council (BBC), an umbrella body representing 11 black business organisations. The BEE 
Commission was tasked to develop a clear and consistent vision and strategy for BEE, 
and Cyril Ramaphosa served as its chairman. The report submitted by the BEE 
Commission in 2000 criticised the narrow defmition of BEE and advocated a broadening 
of the definition and the targets for BEE: 
There is often a tendency in South Mrica to define BEE narrowly and to 
equate it with the development of a black capitalist class ...... BEE should be 
viewed within the broad scope of empowerment processes including, amongst 
others: job creation, rural development, urban renewal, poverty alleviation, land 
ownership, specific measures to empower black women, skills and management 
development, education, meaningful ownership, and access to fmance for 
households and for the purpose of conducting business (BEE Commission 
2001: 1-2). 
Referring to the experience of Afrikaner capitalist development under the National 
Party government, the BEE Commission justified the increasing role the government was 
expected to play in the economic development of the country. It also drew inspiration 
from the experiences of East Asian countries, not least Japan and Malaysia, emphasising 
the role of developmental fmancial institutions that were regulated by the government in 
fostering local (disadvantaged) entrepreneurs (BEE Commission 2001: 1 0) . 
It is striking that the rational for BEE was drawn from an historical precedent of 
affirmative action for Afrikaners in the 1940s. There is nothing new in political 
intervention in the economy in order to favour certain groups of people in South Africa. 
Ramphele (2009: 246) thus notes that "English-speaking business people took steps to 
empower Mrikaners, facilitating their access to economic resources." In a similar vein, 
Cargill (201 0: chap 3) states that the preferential employment of Afrikaners in the civil 
services and in the newly-created state-owned companies in key industries, such as 
transport and energy, contributed to the economic uplifting of Afrikaners9. However, 
both authors also emphasise the important role played by self-help projects and funding 
9 Freund (2012) also sees the National Party government as a historical precedent for the developmental 
state in South Mrica. The idea of the developmental state is also increasingly used to describe growing 
policy intervention by the South African government in the economic sphere. 
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schemes by Afrikaners themselves, in particular Afrikaner-managed financial and 
insurance companies, such as Sanlam and Volkskas, which provided financial assistance to 
Afrikaner entrepreneurs, before the National Party came into power in 1948. 
Black business was not the only body unhappy about the narrow definition of BEE. 
Broadening the definition and targets of BEE was also the government's response to 
pressures from the left, in particular the trade union movement. Rumney (2007: 10) sees 
BEE as a product of a "trade-off" between the government's embrace of neo-liberalism 
in its macro-economic policy, Growth, Emplqyment and E quity (GEAR), announced in 1996, 
and criticism against that neo-liberalism by the left. The Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), part of the tripartite alliance with the ruling ANC, was critical of 
both GEAR and of the fact that earlier BEE transactions made a tiny minority of black 
people billionaires, while the majority of the population did not see any benefits. The 
inclusion of the broader definition of BEE in the BEE Commission's report was 
apparently realised by heavy lobbying activity from COSATU and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) (Gumede 2005: 230). In addition, Gumede (2005) also 
emphasised the role played by Mbeki and Mbeki's belief in BEE. 
!_Mbeki] is extremely touchy about internal criticism of BEE. He considers its 
success to be one of the foundations of the legacy he plans to leave as the 
post-apartheid leader who brought economic benefits to the previously 
disadvantaged. .. .. Mbeki has taken the failure of [the fust phase o~ BEE, 
which he spearheaded from the start, very hard. To him, failure on the black 
economic front means failure in the fight against racism .... He went so far as 
to suggest that failure of BEE would amount to failure of the ANC's historic 
mission of a non-racial society (Gumede 2005: 224, 230). 
Although Mbeki was known as a pro-business president who regularly consulted with 
black and white business leaders on policy matters (Gumede 2005: 215-217), and the 
white business body was clearly against the increasing government intervention in the 
BEE process, ultimately Mbeki accepted the call from the BEE Commission (I'angri and 
Southall 2008: 705). It was during the Mbeki administration that the ANC succeeded in 
consolidating its political power and that the content and practice of the government's 
BEE policy were formulated. The broader definition of BEE proposed by the BEE 
Commission was accepted by the tripartite alliance at a policy workshop in early 2001, 
which was later adopted by the ANC's national conference at the end of 2002 (Gumede 
2005: 231). At the same time, consultations with the private sector were held in the 
President's Black Business and Big Business Working groups set up by Mbeki and at the 
Trade and Industry Chamber of the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC), the South African version of a corporatist body where 
representatives of the government, business, organised labour and civil society discussed 
important policy matters (DTI 2003: 5). 
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In early 2003, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published South Africa} 
Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (the BEE 
strategy document) which described the overall framework and strategy of the 
government's BEE policy. After listing existing legislation to and institutions 11 that 
provide legal and financial support to black companies and BEE projects, the BEE 
strategy document laments the fact that there is no overall strategic framework to 
promote BEE and then states the government's intention to introduce this through a 
BEE bill. It also gives the government's definition of BEE as "an integrated and coherent 
socio-economic process that contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa, 
and brings about significant increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own 
and control the country's economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities" 
(DTI 2003: 10-12, 15). This definition is important as it equates the goal of BEE with 
that of economic transformation and expects BEE to become a driving force in realising 
a more equal society. 
The BEE strategy document also reveals the government's intention to introduce a 
scorecard consisting of seven elements (ownership and management control of a 
company or asset, human resources development ~ater renamed as skills development], 
employment equity, preferential procurement, enterprise development and 
socio-economic development) in order to measure the contribution to BEE of individual 
business entities. It further spells out how the government intends to use the BEE 
standard thus measured by a scorecard. For instance, it states that the government 
considers the BEE level of an entity when it grants a licence in certain regulated 
industries, such as gambling and mining, when it sells state-owned corporations or assets, 
or when it engages in public-private partnerships. Moreover, it articulates the intent that 
the government and state-owned corporations adopt a procurement policy that favours 
BEE compliant companies. Thus, the BEE strategy document makes it clear that the 
government will intervene in economic activities in order to accelerate the BEE process 
in the private sector. Nonetheless, it has made certain concession to white business by 
stating that each sector or company can come up with its own empowerment charter or 
plan to achieve the BEE targets suitable for the particular circumstances of each sector or 
company (DTI 2003). 
The BEE policy was subsequently passed into legislation as the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, Act 53 of 2003 (BBBEE Act), which was promulgated in 
early 2004, and the operational guideline of the BBBEE Act was published in early 2007 
as the Codes of Good Practice on BEE. While the Act defines who should benefit from 
BEE, the Codes sets out how the government measures the BEE level of individual 
entities in detail. The Act defines "black people" not only in racially generic terms, which 
include African, Coloured and Indian people. It also refers to people broadly defmed as 
10 This includes the National Small Business Act (1996), the Preferential Procurement Act (2000), the 
Competition Act (1998), and the Employment Equity Act (1998). 
11 This includes the National Empowerment Fund, Khula, and Industrial Development Corporation 
(lDC). 
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the socially-clisadvantaged, including "women, workers, youth, people with clisabilities and 
people living in rural areas" (Republic of South Africa 2004). On the other hand, the 
Codes give technical details on how each of the seven elements in the BEE scorecard, 
which was proposed in the BEE strategy document mentioned above, will be calculated 
(Republic of South Africa 2007; DTI 2007). Compared to the earlier period of BEE, 
which was led by private corporations, these two pieces of legislation broadened the 
definition of BEE in two senses: one, as to who should be the beneficiaries of BEE, and, 
two, as to how BEE should be achieved. It should also be noted that the measurement of 
the BEE level of each entity became a very technical and complex process, usually done 
by professional firms specialising in the BEE verification business. 
Table 1 is the BEE generic scorecard announced in the Codes. The calculation of the 
points in each element is clivided by several categories and respective targets. For instance, 
the ownership element, which is allocated 20 points, is calculated on the bases of the 
voting rights of black men and women, the stock ownership of black men and women, 
the inclusion of an employees' share scheme, and so forth. Each company is classified 
into nine categories of BEE status from level one contributor (highest) to non-compliant 
(lowest), depending on the number of points the company acquires. While a level one 
contributor obtains 135% BEE recognition when it applies for a public procurement, a 
non-compliant contributor gets 0% recognition. All companies operating in South Africa 
are expected to contribute to the goals of BEE, but multi-national companies can be 
exempted from requirement in the ownership element, i.e. giving part of their shares to 
black people, by adopting alternative measures that are sanctioned by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industryl2. 





Skills D evelopment 
Preferential Procurement 
Enterprise D evelopment 
Socio-Economic Development 
Total 










Since the BEE status of each entity that is calculated by the scorecard is to be used by 
the government in granting a public procurement, it is particularly important for 
companies that are interested in these procurements, such as companies in the 
tz "Equity Equivalent Programme for Multinationals" (http://www. thedti.gov.za/ economic 
_empowerment/eguity.jsp, accessed 25 January 2013). 
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construction industry, to comply with BEE requirements. In addition, the government 
expects that preferential procurement based on BEE standards will become important in 
transactions between private companies throughout the supply chain. This is because 
even if a company is not involved in the public procurement process, its transaction 
partner may be interested in getting higher BEE status in order to obtain a public 
procurement. In this way, the government hopes to spread the pressure of BEE 
compliance to the entire economic sphere (Republic of South Africa 2007; DTI 2007). 
As mentioned, the BEE Strategy document left room for industry players to set their 
own BEE goals and targets in accordance with the unique circumstances of each industry. 
This is also a characteristic aspect of the BEE policy of the South Mrican government, 
and it reflects the strength of industry and the influence of large corporations in the 
country. While the DTI came up with a generic scorecard to measure the BEE 
compliance level of individual business entities for the public procurement process, major 
stakeholders in several industries began to negotiate the contents of industry-wide 
transformation charters. These industry charters become public documents when they are 
publicised in the government gazette under the terms of Section 12 of the BBBEE Act. 
They are announcements of industry players' commitment to transformation and BEE 
and as such they do not have a legally binding status. On the other hand, each industry 
can also gazette its transformation charter under the terms of Section 9 of the BBBEE 
Act. In this case, a sector charter obtains a legal status as a Sector Code of Good Practice, 
which has the same status as the BBBEE Codes of Good Practice discussed above (DTI 
2007). 
According to the DTI website, nine industries (Tourism, Construction, Forest, 
Transport, Chartered Accountancy, Property, Information and Communication 
Technology: ICT, Finance, and Agriculture) gazetted their own Sector Codes between 
2009 and 2012. In addition, the Marketing, Advertising and Communication (MAC) 
sector gazetted its transformation charter13. Thus, it is arguable that, to date, not many 
industries have shown their eagerness to tackle the question of transformation actively. 
However, those industries that have gazetted Sector Codes tend to set higher targets for 
their BEE compliance. For instance, both the construction and the ICT industries set the 
target rate of black ownership at 30%, not the 25% required by the BBBEE Act. In the 
tourism industry, where small companies predominate, only those who have an annual 
turnover of less than 2.5 million rand, not 5 million rand as specified by the Act, are 
exempted from complying with the BEE targets. The fmancial industry has added the 
provision or facilitation of financial services to black people or black-owned companies 
as the eighth element in its own BEE scorecard (Hamann, Khagram and Rohan 2008: 
31-35). 
The mining industry occupies an exceptional position in the South African BEE 
process (Southall2005: 466-468; Harnann, Khagram and Rohan 2008: 28-31). Mainly due 
13 "B-B BEE Sector Charters" (http:/ /www.thedci.gov.za/ economic_empowerment/bee_sector 
_charters.jsp, accessed 25 January 2013). 
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to the fact that the government can intervene vigorously through its regulatory power of 
granting licences, it has the most effective BEE codes. The Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act, Act 28 of 2002, which came into effect in May 2004, is 
essentially the transformation code of the mining industry. The Act stipulates that owners 
of old mining rights would lose their mining rights, unless they converted them into new 
mining rights within five years (by May 2009). One of the major conditions imposed on 
the old mining rights holders to convert to new mining rights was to comply with the 
ownership requirement of the mining charter. The mining charter stipulated that each 
mining house has to realise 15% black ownership by May 2009, which has to be increased 
to 26% by May 2014 (Wu and Moodley 2009). 
A lot of mining companies rushed to find black partners in order to sell their shares. 
According to Wu and Moodley (2009), 115 BEE transactions, including sales by BEE 
entities, were reported in the newspapers between 2004 and 2009, and their market 
capitalisation amounted to just under 102 billion rand. More than 70% of these 
transactions were cases where BEE companies obtained mining company shares. Just 
over 10% of the transactions involved joint ventures between BEE companies and 
existing mining companies, while 21 transactions were cases where BEE companies sold 
their shares or mining assets. The number of BEE transactions in the mining industry 
amounted to about 19% of the total BEE transactions of )SE-listed companies during 
this period. Thus, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act has 
undoubtedly contributed to increasing black ownership in the South African mining 
industry. 
Yet it was not a flawless process. In particular, the majority of the BEE transactions in 
the mining industry characteristically excluded mine workers from the deal-making 
process. Only 7% of the number of BEE transactions in the mining industry between 
2004 and 2009 included schemes by which employees could become direct shareholders. 
Furthermore, only 10% included broader community schemes as part of their deals. Thus 
the direct involvement of employees or broad-based community empowerment schemes 
are not common in the mining industry. This is because the mining companies prefer to 
deal with black investors as their BEE partners, as they are believed to be better equipped 
to acquire mining right and develop a mine (Wu and Moodley 2009). The exclusion of 
mine workers and their surrounding communities from the BEE deals, however, began to 
produce negative consequences. When the Marikana incident took place in August 2012, 
some media were quick to highlight the contrast between the black beneficiaries of the 
BEE deals in the mining industry and the mounting grievances of the miners who were 
left out of the process14. Cyril Ramaphosa, who is widely perceived as a symbol of a 
successful BEE businessman and owns shares in several mining companies, including 
Lonmin, the owner of the Marikana platinum mine, also became a symbol of the "filthy 
14 "Lonmin Violence: It's D-Day for the Unions;' Mail and Guardian Online, 17 August 2012; ''NUM: A 
Union's Striking Fall from Grace;' Mail and Guardian Online, 6 September 2012. 
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rich"15 who do not reflect upon the predicaments of the nune workers and their 
surrounding communities16. 
3. DERACIALISING THE ECONOMY: THE IMPACT OF INCREASING 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE BEE PROCESS 
It is safe to say that increasing state intervention in the BEE process through the 
legislation of the BBBEE Act and its Codes of Good Practice, together with the 
enactment of industry-wide transformation charters, has accelerated the incorporation of 
black people intO the mainstream of economic activities. Even though it is not easy to 
gather reliable numeric evidence to measure the impact of the increasing interventions 
and pressure by the government on the progress of BEE, the following three indices all 
seem to testify to this. 
Figure 1 Number of BEE Transactions and Their Financial 











Sources: BEE Commission (2001 : 24) for 1993-1994, SAIRR (2010: 336) for 1995-2009. 
The first index is an increase in the number of BEE transactions. Figure 1 shows the 
number of BEE transactions and their market capitalisation on the JSE from 1993 to 
2009. Although the number of BEE transactions on the JSE decreased from 1999 to 
2002 after the South-East Asian economic crisis, it has surged since then, especially 
ts It is said that Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Minister of Minerals and Energy of the first Mbeki 
administration, stated at that time at "a gathering of black businessmen that they should not be ashamed 
of wanting to be 'filthy rich"' (Sole 2010: 197). 
16 Ramaphosa was elected as the deputy president of the ANC at the national conference in Mangaung in 
December 2012, which means that he will most probably become deputy president of the country after 
the next general elections in 2014 . .After the .ANC Mangaung conference, it was widely speculated in the 
media how Ramaphosa would reconcile his existing business interests and his newly-assumed political role. 
In late January 2013, it was reported that Ramaphosa will guit the boards of two large corporations artd 
one of them is Lonmin. "Ramaphosa Quits Mondi and Lonmin Boards," Mail and Guardian Online, 23 
Jartuary 2013. 
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around the time when the BBBEE Act came into being. The amount of market 
capitalisation of BEE transactions was also higher in the late 2000s than in the late 1990s. 
This is mainly due to several large BEE transactions in the mining and financial sectors 
between 2003 and 2007. The proportion of BEE transactions in the total number of 
transactions on the JSE in value terms has also been more significant after 2003. From 
1994 to 2002, it was usually around 5-15% of the total, except in 1995 when it amounted 
to 38.7%. It surged to 38.9% in 2003 and to 42.2% in 2004. After that, it has remained 
around 23-26% (SAIIR 2010: 337). 
The second index is the proportion of black share ownership on the JSE. Although 
this is probably most frequently mentioned in order to describe the degree of black 
ownership of the economy, it is not easy to find reliable, consistent figures over a certain 
period of time. For instance, according to M'paradzi and Kalula (2007: 18-20), black 
ownership increased from less than 1% of market capitalisation of the JSE in 1993 to 
18% in 1997. The problem is that we do not know whether these figures include 
shareholdings by institutional investors such as pension funds. Institutional investors have 
a non-negligible presence on the JSE, as the Mail and Guardian Online reported in late 2011 
that out of 17% of market capitalisations of the JSE that were owned by black people, 
more than half (9%) were in fact owned by institutional investors17. Comparing these 
figures between 1997 and 2011 makes us think that the black ownership of ]SE-listed 
corporations has not increased significantly since the late 1990s, even though the number 
of BEE transactions has increased in the 2000s. However, as the proportion of black 
ownership on the JSE is also influenced by the size of the corporations whose shares 
black people own, this proportion might have been much larger if major corporations, 
such as SABMiller and Anglo American Corporations, had not been allowed to change 
the venue of their first-listing from the JSE to the London Stock Exchange. 
The third index is the improvement in the BEE scorecards of large corporations. In 
the mid-2000s, only 24.7% out of the 1,782 firms surveyed by a local think-tank had an 
official BBBEE scorecard (Consulta Research 2007)18. This situation seems to have 
changed dramatically in the last three years (especially since 2009). The BEE scorecard of 
top empowerment firms, collected and announced by Empowerdex Inc, a company 
specialising in the BEE verification and certification business, in the l:'znancial Mail (a 
Johannesburg-based weekly business magazine), shows significant improvements (fable 
2). It is possible that the improved scorecards are merely a reflection of technical 
17 "Black Shareholders Own 17% of JSE," Mail and Guardian Online, 4 October 2011. Prominent 
institutional investors with a BEE character include the investment wings of major trade unions, such as 
the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' 
Union (SACTWU), which began investing their assets in stock markets in the early 1990s. However, it is 
pointed out that the individual members of these trade unions rarely receive tangible benefits from their 
investment activities (M'paradzi and Kalula 2007: 40). 
18 According to this study, the private firms surveyed gave three major reasons that have prevented the 
progress of BEE: (1) the perception that only a small number of privileged black people benefit from it, 
(2) the lack of necessary skills among newly qualified employees, and (3) a high turnover rate among black 
people in the private business sector (Consulta Research 2007). 
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manoeuvrmg m the calculation of points rather than of any genuine change in the 
workplace. Not just the scores of several companies but also the overall points of the 
BBBEE scorecard have improved on average in the last three years. Nonetheless, there 
seems to be no doubt that private corporations operating in South Africa are feeling 
increasing pressure to comply with the targets of BEE (fakazaki 2012). 
Table 2 Progress of BEE Scorecard by the Top 20 Empowerment 
Companies, 2005-2011 
Rank Company 
1 Standard Bank of SA 
2 Sekunjalo Investments 
3 Nedbank 
4 Kelly Group 




































2011 2010 2009 2008 2006 2005 
92.83 75.77 72.4 70.08 34.47 34.55 
92.27 90.8 64.51 57.4 76.44 64.47 
89.5 86.4 82.45 67.81 48.1 n.a. 
88.73 78.28 82.28 57.56 n.a. n.a. 
87.78 82.12 84.63 76.8 25.85 30 
87.06 88.05 88.71 81.69 66.49 58.1 7 
86.99 69.3 69.21 50.45 n.a. 39.09 
86.65 75.17 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Food & Beverages 86.49 78.23 76.17 75.64 34.36 33.41 
Media 86.25 86.25 64.56 37.88 42.65 54.88 
Basic Industrials 85.78 78.77 60.79 55.27 63.68 6.67 
Basic Industrials 84.41 n.a. 64.14 65.59 21.59 18.45 
Travel & Leisure 84.04 71.95 69.14 67.54 70.04 54.79 
Basic Industrials 83.91 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Financials 83.82 83.84 62.67 n.a. 60.44 65.32 
16 Metropolitan Holdings Financials 83.79 76.75 69.35 73.01 43.95 61.69 
17 OceanaGroup Food&Beverages 83.31 71.76 71.31 70.93 40.76 32.52 
18 Barloworld General Industrials 82.89 75.24 17.31 n.a. n.a. 35.5 
19 Optimum Coal Basic Resources 82.65 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Holdings 
19 Netcare Health Care 82.65 77.98 75.42 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Empowerdex (various years) . 
A closer look at the BEE scorecard also shows that progress is uneven among different 
industries as well as among different BEE elements. Based on their analysis of 228 
JSE-listed comparues, Wu, Serrao and Matjakana (2006) report that BEE is most 
advanced in medicine and pharmaceuticals, services, transport, and the IT sectors. For 
these industries, the public sector is a very important client. Thus, the government policy 
of preferring BEE-compliant companies when it grants tenders is exerting real pressure 
on private companies. As for the progress of different elements in the scorecard, the 
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same report reveals that while certain progress has occurred in four elements (ownership, 
skills development, enterprise development and corporate social investment: CSI), 
progress is least in two elements (employment equity and preferential procurement), 
which could potentially broaden the number of beneficiaries of BEE. 
This confirms observations by many scholars and political commentators that the 
actual progress of BEE is still largely confined to BEE deals and the appointment of 
black directors (usually non-executive directors) in the boardrooms, in spite of the spirit 
of the BBBEE Act. As a result, the beneficiaries of BEE programmes are still conftned 
to a small segment of the black population. This is the most common and significant 
criticism of the current BEE process in South Africa (Freund 2007: 672). Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, COSATU, the SACP, and several ANC leaders, including Kgalema 
Modanthe and Trevor Manuel, all criticised BEE as "simply recycling an 
[already-empowered] elite" (Southall 2006: 177; Tangri and Southall 2008: 709). Ponte, 
Roberts and van Sittert (2007: 947) state that "[d]espite its 'broad-based' characterization, 
politically well-connected figures, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Patrice Motsepe, Tokyo 
Sexwale and Saki Macozoma, have remained at the forefront of empowerment deals 
throughout the second phase of BEE." The names of these four businessmen appear 
repeatedly in both the concluded BEE deals and the literature that is critical of BEE 
(Ramphere 2008: 248-249). 
Thus, South Africa seems to have encountered the same problem of crony capitalism 
as Malaysia in implementing affirmative action policy. This issue has long been raised by 
Moeletsi Mbeki, a prominent political commentator and the brother of former President 
Mbeki, who sees the relationship between the new black elites and the South African state 
as corrupt and problematic (Mbeki 2009: 69-73; Ramphere 2008: 247-249; Seekings and 
Nattrass 2005: 345). It has been noted that there are problems of corruption and abuse 
of power by politicians and officials in the D eparttnent of Mineral Resources in granting 
mining rights (Cargill 2010: chap 4), but the mining industry is not an exception. The 
increasing intervention by the government in the BEE process, in particular, the direct 
connection between public tenders and BEE, seems to have opened up opportunities for 
both government officials and private companies to utilise BEE for personal gain (Marais 
2011: 143). Increasingly, BEE deals have been "negotiated to preserve a company's ability 
to secure government contracts and licenses" (Tangri and Southall 2008: 707). The extent 
of corruption is difficult to measure, but the following numbers cited by Sole (2010: 197) 
are alarming: in 2009 "more than 2000 government officials were doing business direcdy 
with the government and had direcdy or indirecdy benefited from government tenders 
worth more than R600 million." 
Last, but not least, a critical voice is growing against a government that seems to have 
decided to equate economic transformation with BEE. Scholars question the character of 
the black capitalist class and argue that it is not necessarily a progressive force. Thus, 
Southall (2006: 198) notes that although BEE deals may represent "welcome progress 
towards a deracialisation of corporate structures, it offers little indication of serious 
movement towards a capitalism that is more democratic." BEE firms operate on the same 
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business principles as any other companies in that there is the demand that they maximise 
profits, therefore they "are indistinguishable from 'white' firms'' (Marais 2011: 142-143). 
There is no reason to believe that BEE firms will boost small business or create more 
employment opportunities (Seekings and Nattrass 2005: 344-345; Freund 2007: 670; 
Southall 2006: 197). Stripped of surplus capital and struggling with debt to finance their 
operations, emerging BEE firms could even resort to more exploitative labour practices 
in order to establish themselves in the corporate world (Du Toit, Kruger and Ponte 2008). 
CONCLUSION 
BEE is one of the key items on the social and political agenda in democratic South Africa. 
Its goal has increasingly been seen as synonymous with economic transformation, yet its 
process and results have attracted growing criticism within South Mrican society. This 
chapter discussed the development path of BEE policy and practice since the 1990s, 
tracing its prominent features and highlighting both its progress and its problems. 
Although the BEE process was initiated by the white corporate sector amid a lack of 
concrete policy directions on the part of the newly-elected ANC government in 1994, it 
was quickly taken up by the government under President Mbeki who saw BEE as "the 
ANC's historic mission of a non-racial society" (Gumede 2005: 230). It was during the 
Mbeki administration that the ANC achieved a two-thirds majority in the national 
parliament and the government's BEE policy strategy was formulated. Thus the second 
phase of BEE since the enactment of the BBBEE Act has been characterised as 
increasing state intervention in the BEE process through the introduction of the BEE 
scorecard and the utilisation of public procurements as an incentive for private 
companies to comply with BEE goals. 
Importantly, the second phase of BEE aimed to broaden the beneficiaries of BEE 
from a tiny minority of a black elite with political connections to the wider population. 
This was the fundamental demand put forward by black business people through the 
BEE Commission as well as by black workers represented by COSATU. In particular, 
COSATU and SACP, which are political allies of the ANC, grew frustrated under the 
Mbeki administration, which seemed to marginalise their influence in the policy-making 
process. COSATU's dissatisfaction over the contents of BEE was part of the reason why 
it decided to support Zuma in his bid for power in the campaign for the ANC leadership 
in December 2007 (fangri and Southall 2008: 714). Zuma was elected as ANC president 
at its national conference in Polokwane and became the South African president after the 
general elections in 2009. Mbeki resigned from the presidency in September 2008 and 
those who supported him at the Polokwane conference split from the ANC and formed a 
new political party called the Congress of the People (COPE). Thus, it is arguable that 
BEE, which Mbeki pursued from the bottom of his heart, provided the fatal blow to his 
political career. 
Whether Zuma can avoid the same mistakes as Mbeki remains to be seen, but 
Zwelinzima Vavi, secretary-general of COSATU, who is believed to be very popular 
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among ordinary members of the trade union movement and who helped Zuma to defeat 
Mbeki at Polokwane, has been increasingly critical of the growing number of incidents of 
political nepotism and "tenderpreneurs" under the Zuma administration. Significantly, in 
spite of the configuration of political support that backed Zuma for the ANC presidency 
in Polokwane, the Zuma administration has opted not to change the direction of the 
Mbeki administration's policy in most fields, apart from its HIV /AIDS policy (Makino 
2013) and South Africa's diplomatic stance on the Zimbabwe crisis. Although the political 
power struggle within the ANC was repeated at a national conference in December 2012 
in Mangaung, this time it was more about the personality of the ANC leadership, not least 
that of its president, and little discussion was held on policy matters. Since Zuma was 
re-elected as ANC president, it is most likely that he will have a second term as the 
president of the country after the next elections in 2014. It seems implausible to expect 
that BEE will become a truly broad-based policy under his administration. 
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